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own trained teachers. We find that treated students make more patient intertemporal
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1 Introduction
A growing body of research shows that certain attitudes and personality traits, also referred to as
“noncognitive skills”, are strongly associated with achievement in various economic and social domains.
Among these traits, patience and self-control attract particular attention, as empirical studies show
their predictive power on outcomes including educational attainment, occupational success, and a
range of health outcomes such as obesity and substance abuse.1 A strand of this literature studies
children, and shows that the childhood period is important for the formation and development of
a set of crucial noncognitive skills (see Heckman et al. (2006)). In particular, among children and
adolescents, impatience has been found to be associated with a higher likelihood of using alcohol and
cigarettes, a higher body mass index, a lower propensity to save, lower grades, and more disciplinary
conduct violations at school (Castillo et al. (2011), Sutter et al. (2013)). These correlations tend to
persist into adulthood: studies in both economics and psychology have shown that individuals who
displayed patience and self-control as a child or adolescent have better outcomes in terms of health,
performance in school, labor market success, social competence, and lifetime income (e.g. Golsteyn et
al. (2014), Moffitt et al. (2011), Mischel et al. (1989)).
The studies cited above aim to answer the question of what factors are associated with, for example,
being more patient or more able to delay gratification. However, little is known about whether it is
possible to make an individual act in a more forward-looking manner or cope with self-control issues
better, that is, whether these traits are malleable. The literature on early childhood interventions
provides valuable insights in this regard. These interventions are typically directed at bolstering
cognitive skills in order to close achievement gaps, and report favorable results in various key domains
in social life, especially in disadvantaged children. However the main channel seems to be enhanced
noncognitive skills rather than cognition; see Heckman et al. (2014), Heckman and Kautz (2014) and
the references therein for an extensive review of these interventions.
Further evidence on the potential malleability of noncognitive skills comes from a separate but
related literature, which shows that life experiences and exposure to exogenous shocks such as conflict
or natural disasters can alter preferences and personality traits in general, and time preference in
particular (e.g. Perez-Arce et al. (2011), Voors et al. (2012)). Coupled with the evidence that
personality traits are influenced by the childhood environment (Borghans et al. (2008)), these findings
provide reason to expect that a targeted educational program aiming to develop a forward-looking
1See Fuchs (1982), Laibson (1994), Laibson et al (1998), Bickel et al (1999), Della Vigna and Paserman (2005),
Heckman et al (2006), Knudsen et al (2006), Ameriks et al (2007), Meier and Sprenger (2010), Jamison et al (2012),
Finke and Huston (2013) and Sampson (2016).
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attitude can lead to more patient intertemporal decisions in children. Supporting this on the theory
side, Becker and Mulligan (1997) suggest that forward-looking behavior and the ability to focus on
the future when making intertemporal consumption choices can be learned as part of general human
capital accumulation.
Motivated by the aforementioned studies and in particular the literature on early childhood in-
terventions, we design and evaluate an educational program in collaboration with a multidisciplinary
team, targeting 3rd and 4th graders in elementary schools in Turkey. The program specifically aims
to improve the ability to act in a forward-looking manner and to exercise self-control in intertemporal
decision contexts. It is implemented through a set of carefully-designed education materials (case
studies, stories, in-class games) that are conveyed by children’s own trained teachers. The core idea
behind the program is to impart the ability or develop the habit of imagining and carefully evaluating
the future consequences of alternative courses of action in order to make future utilities vivid and
less remote, i.e. teach forward-looking behavior. The objective of the paper is to identify the causal
effect of this program on children’s intertemporal choices. In particular, we are interested in showing
whether the intervention increased the willingness to defer consumption, using children’s actual in-
tertemporal consumption choices as outcomes. These choices are elicited in the context of widely-used
incentivized intertemporal decision tasks, in which choices or allocations are known to be associated
with underlying time preferences as well as behaviors and real outcomes outside of the experimental
setting.
The program is implemented using a version of a phase-in randomized-controlled design, where
subgroups of participating schools implement the program in different periods of time. The initial
phase of the program, in which the teachers in a random subset of the participating schools received
the training material, was implemented in Spring 2013. The next phase was implemented on another
subgroup of treatment schools in Fall 2013, practically replicating the intervention. Students that are
in the remaining schools, which constitute our “pure control” group, never received training and moved
on to middle school at the end of Spring 2014, making long-term follow-up possible.
We compare the intertemporal choices of these three groups in three different measurement phases
in elementary school (end of Spring 2013, end of Fall 2013, end of Spring 2014). This, combined with
the phase-in nature of the design, allows us to both study the temporal nature of the treatment effect at
different intervals after the conclusion of the program, and to establish the robustness of results across
different samples and measurement methods. The effectiveness of the program is measured in terms
of students’ behavior in incentivized experimental tasks as well as their actual behavioral conduct,
as graded and reported to the school administration. In addition, rich information is collected on
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student, teacher and family characteristics via baseline surveys, and assessment reports by the teacher
for each individual child. We complement these main data with a follow-up measurement effort in
March 2016, where we track a significant portion of the children in our sample almost 3 years after
the initial treatment phase. We report experimental and survey outcomes from this final measurement
phase to explore the longer-term effects of the program.
We find that treated students make significantly more patient intertemporal choices in incentivized
time preference elicitation tasks. More specifically, treated children require a significantly lower interest
payment (in gifts) than control children to choose delayed consumption over early consumption, and
they allocate significantly more consumption to a future date than control children, in a context where
waiting pays. The result that treated children make more patient choices is (1) robust to the use of
alternative elicitation tasks, (2) persists when the decisions are made anonymously, (3) persists up to
almost 3 years following the intervention. We find that while the program makes a uniform impact on
children with different characteristics in the short-term, its effect on patience persists for girls, students
with better academic standing and those who made dynamically consistent choices at baseline.
In addition to treatment effects on choices in intertemporal decision tasks, a quite striking finding
that emerges from our data is that one year after the intervention, treated students are about 10
percentage points less likely to receive a low “behavior grade”, based on official school administrative
records. We also provide evidence that the main channel for improved behavioral conduct at school
is the improved ability to defer consumption, i.e., patience. This finding is consistent with the recent
evidence on the relationship between time preference and disciplinary conduct at school (Castillo et
al. (2011), Sutter et al. (2013)).
The paper makes several contributions to the literature. To our knowledge, this is the first study to
date that i) directly targets intertemporal decision making in a classroom environment at such young
ages, ii) evaluates causal impact by measuring changes in experimental and real-life behavior and out-
comes within a randomized-control framework, and iii) quantifies short- and longer-term impact that is
robust to using alternative measurement methods and in two independent samples. The paper also of-
fers useful insights for guiding education policy. There has been widespread concern over dismal school
outcomes and widening achievement gaps in most countries, despite genuine efforts by governments
and sizable resources devoted to both increasing school attendance and the quality of teaching. Our
study can be viewed as a cost-effective supplement to these efforts. Embedding character education
into the general elementary school curriculum via fun activities and games tailored to core objectives
takes little effort and drains much less resources than most educational programs, and can produce
significant improvements in key noncognitive skills such as the ability to delay gratification.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the background of the program,
Section 3 discusses the content of the intervention and expected behavioral change, Section 4 explains
the evaluation design and measurement procedures, Section 5 presents the data and discusses the
results, and Section 6 concludes.
2 Program Background
As of 2012, twelve years of compulsory education is divided into 3 stages of 4 years of schooling in
Turkey. Transition to middle school is required after grade 4 and the pupil receives the next 4 years
of compulsory education in middle school, with the last 4 received in high school.
The program we evaluate is one of the arms of a set of randomized-controlled interventions designed
to improve certain noncognitive skills in elementary school children in the classroom environment. The
program is implemented in a large number of state elementary schools in Istanbul, Turkey, with the
permission and oversight of the Ministry of Education.2 While a few decades ago only the very rich
would send their children to private schools, the enlarging middle class of Turkey now mainly prefers
private schools to public schools for their children. Therefore, the program mainly reaches students
from lower socio-economic backgrounds, although there still is considerable variation in socio-economic
status across students in our sample, which we exploit in our analyses.
The program we help develop and evaluate was offered as part of a corporate social responsibility
project of a major international bank’s Turkish division. The Ministry of Education encourages schools
and teachers to participate in socially useful projects offered by the private sector, NGOs, government
and international institutions. These projects, upon careful examination and endorsement by the
Ministry, are made available to interested schools. The ministry allows up to 5 lecture hours per week
for project-related activities and participation in these projects is at the discretion of teachers. Many
of these projects involve issues such as environment, art, foreign languages, health, dental care, etc.
In the absence of any projects, students use the free hours as unstructured playtime, so these projects
do not crowd-out any core teaching.
After obtaining permission from the Ministry, contacted teachers were informed that upon partic-
ipation, they would be invited to training seminars on topics around financial awareness and savings,
and that they would be asked to cover materials prepared for the students within an eight-week period
for at least 2 hours a week. They were not informed about the full nature and content of the materials
2The Ministry of National Education is centrally responsible for developing and monitoring curricula, allocating teach-
ers, building schools and communicating with the private sector and NGOs for extra-curricular projects. For the tasks
used in measurement, we obtained ethics approval from the local IRB, which included parental consent requirements.
Consent was denied by the parents only in case of five students.
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until they arrived at the seminars and they were never informed about any measurement procedure
throughout the project. The training seminars were conducted by education consultants, where teach-
ers were given extensive training on the use of the materials and on the importance of the targeted
noncognitive skill for achievement. The education materials, including many supplementary classroom
activities related to the core topics were delivered to the teachers after all baseline data were collected
and teacher training seminars were conducted. In the implementation phase of the intervention, the
materials were conveyed to students within the weekly free hours allocated to teachers.
3 Intervention and Expected Behavioral Change
The target concepts of the educational program were determined by the authors, and revolved around
visualizing the future and evaluating intertemporal tradeoffs in a forward-looking manner. These
concepts and potential decision contexts in which they apply were conveyed to a multidisciplinary
team of education psychologists, a group of (volunteer) elementary school teachers, children’s story
writers and media artists. This team then prepared the actual educational materials according to
the age and cognitive capacity of the students, under the guidance of the authors. The core material
involves 8 mini case studies and supporting class activities, with topics that include imagining the
future-self (forward-looking behavior), self-control against temptation goods, smart shopping, games
to make future utilities vivid and close-by, saving for a target, viewing and evaluating alternative future
outcomes, and developing coping mechanisms against temptation to meet a savings target.
The cases generally involve critically evaluating alternative realizations of the future based on given
actions. Most of these actions relate to consumption and saving behavior, but not all. Case studies are
generally open-ended and are followed by questions to initiate class discussions. As per a request by
the Ministry of Education, a teacher toolkit that highlights the aims and potential benefits of each case
as well as clear instructions of how to cover the materials was prepared for the teachers, in addition
to the information given in the teacher training seminars.3
To give an example, in the first week, children cover a case study titled “Zeynep’s Time Machine”,
telling the story of Zeynep, a girl who wants a bike for which she has to save, but is also faced
with alluring short term consumption possibilities. The time machine allows Zeynep to travel to
two alternative future states (having saved for the bike or not), and observe the consequences of
her decisions. Students discuss how Zeynep would feel in each scenario and are asked to imagine
themselves in similar situations. Case studies are complemented by class activities and games. A
3Details of each case study and some sample visuals can be found in the online appendix.
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sample class activity complementing Zeynep’s story involves children actually building a time machine
and pretending to travel to future dates of their choice that are important in terms of target-setting
(e.g. end of the semester, when they get their report cards), as well as drawing related pictures. These
activities are designed to help children more vividly imagine future outcomes and related payoffs.
Sample photographs of this class activity are given in the online appendix.
The overarching goal of the educational program is to help children develop the habit of evaluating
the future consequences of their actions when making intertemporal decisions. A treated child is
expected to more easily and more vividly imagine, or remember to think carefully about how he/she
would feel as a result of a certain action in the future. Such differences in how future payoffs are
evaluated would be expected to translate into differences in the weight placed onto today vs. the
future, and lead to more patient decisions on the part of treated children in intertemporal decision
contexts. Our impact evaluation strategy is built on this hypothesis, and compares the willingness to
delay consumption on the part of treated and untreated children in intertemporal allocation tasks.
At this point, it is important to note that special care was taken to use the stories in case studies
to start discussions about alternative courses of action and to encourage forward-looking behavior
rather than giving children direct, unquestioned “advice” to act patiently. Such direct advice could
also potentially compromise our evaluation results, and exacerbate the potential concern that the
impact we document on patient behavior in experiments is there because the teacher “taught children
to a test”. In line with this, the idea of interpersonal differences in time preference was also strongly
emphasized in the teacher training seminars, by iterating multiple times that the objective here is not
to push children to act patiently, since it is not clear that this is the right thing to do for everyone in
all circumstances. Rather, the objective is to develop a forward-looking mindset that evaluates future
as well as current payoffs from a given action before taking that action. In fact, one of the case studies
introduces twin sisters who have different time preferences and are faced with the same intertemporal
decision problem of earlier-lower quality consumption and later-higher quality consumption. Here,
students discuss all alternative actions (waiting or not waiting) and consequences for both sisters,
which include not waiting to consume and having no regrets about not waiting to consume as well.
From a theoretical standpoint, there can be different mechanisms through which an educational
intervention like the current one might affect intertemporal choices. One framework that fits very
well with the ideas put forth in our educational content is the one proposed by Becker and Mulligan
(1997). Becker and Mulligan argue that foresight can be improved, i.e., building the ability to judge the
benefits of the future in exchange for today’s pleasures is possible through investment and individual
effort. The idea is that individuals can spend mental resources and learn to make future situations less
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remote. This can help them evaluate future utilities correctly and learn to reason with the present-self
better, lessening the pressure of immediate gratification and leading to lower subjective discount rates.
A simple exposition that captures this reasoning is as follows:
Consider two periods: pre-program (1) and post-program (0). Suppose child i is endowed with
discount factor δ0 pre-training,
δ0 = ϕ(XP , IP )
where XP is a vector of background characteristics and skills (possibly genetic) and IP is parental
investment for child’s time preference where ϕ is a concave function such that ∂ϕ∂Ip > 0 and there
are diminishing returns. Now, suppose that while individuals’ time preferences are initially shaped
by parental characteristics and investments in the pre-school period, they may evolve further in the
school environment through programs specifically designed to influence them, such that:
δ1 = ψ(e(IT ), δ0(.))
where δ1 is the post-program discount factor for child i and e is the effort child i exerts to make distant












≥0. An educational investment implemented by the teacher (IT ), which specifi-
cally encourages forward thinking, may promote the effort the child puts into visualizing and judging
(weighting) future utilities, by either highlighting the benefits or reducing the costs of such effort. In
either case, the expected behavioral change would be for the child to make more patient choices. This
type of investment is typically expected to be made by parents; however, we argue that a well-equipped
teacher can also contribute greatly to the development of a child’s time preferences. Note also that
these two types of investments could be substitutes or complements, such that in the case of perfect
complementarity, the teacher’s investment would have no effect on the time preferences of the child
without parental investment.
While it is possible that an intervention of this sort may affect underlying time preferences, i.e.,
lower discount rates, it may also alter risk preferences. In that case, the differences in consumption
allocations we observe between treated and untreated children at a single cross section would reflect
a combination of changes in discount rates and risk aversion; an extreme case would be where the
intervention lowers risk aversion sufficiently to match the observed changes in consumption allocations,
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with no change in discount rates at all. In Section 5.3, using a well-known risk attitude elicitation task
implemented pre- and post- treatment, we show that the intervention had no impact on the distribution
of students’ risk attitudes. Given the exclusive focus of the educational program on forward thinking,
which is not easily relatable to risk taking, this finding is not surprising. However, a more complex
interplay between time and risk preferences, not fully captured by our measures, is still difficult to rule
out empirically, so we cannot claim that the higher willingness to defer consumption in the treated
group comes from a change in the underlying time preferences.
Aside from changes in underlying time and/or risk preferences, other mechanisms could also be
in effect and lead to changes in intertemporal choice. One such alternative is self-signalling. Several
papers in the literature have put forward models where individuals care about their self-image in their
own eyes, and can change their behavior to manage their own impression of themselves (e.g. Bodner
and Prelec (2003)). If the program works through instilling patience as a “valued personality trait” in
children’s minds and makes them aspire to being a patient person, this could generate an extra utility
component from being able to delay gratification and thereby lead to more patient behavior. Such
a model would give rise to the same hypothesis as above, which is that children who are exposed to
the program will make more patient choices when faced with an intertemporal decision problem. Note
that, to the extent that this behavioral response to the intervention is habit-forming, it may eventually
lead to a change in time preferences as well.
It is important to stress here that the point of our paper is not to test any particular theory; nor
is it an attempt to estimate the effect of the treatment on discount rates. The latter would require
specifying a particular preference structure over the consumption of toys for 9-10 year old children
who are asked to make simple intertemporal allocation choices. Although certainly valuable, such an
analysis is better suited to later in the life cycle, when individuals can be presented with a rich menu
of time and state trade-offs. Our focus in the paper is then confined to putting forward novel empirical
evidence that the willingness to defer consumption may be indeed malleable in childhood in the short
and the longer-term via a targeted educational program. As we will explain in more detail in Section 5,
we present causal evidence for malleability not by providing a structural estimation of discount rates,
but rather by documenting differences between treated and untreated children in terms of how patient
their choices are, in incentivized experimental tasks in which behavior is known to be associated with
time preference and related outcomes.
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4 Design and Measurement
4.1 Evaluation Design
Our experimental protocol follows a version of a "phase-in" design, where randomly selected schools
(unit of randomization) receive training at different points. This allows us to evaluate the causal impact
of the program and assess its ability to generate robust treatment effects across different phases and
samples.
After the official documents were sent to all elementary schools in designated districts of Istanbul
by the Istanbul Directorate of Education, 3rd grade teachers in these schools were contacted in random
sequence and were offered to participate in the program. They were informed that upon participation
they would be assigned to different training phases within the coming two academic years. Once a
teacher stated a willingness to participate, we assigned her/his school to one of the three treatment
groups: A willing teacher had a 40 percent chance of being in the initial treatment group (IT hence-
forth), a 30 percent chance of being in the control-then-treatment group (CT henceforth), and a 30
percent chance of being in the pure control group (PC henceforth). Random assignment was done at
the school level and not at the classroom level, since the physical proximity of classrooms and teachers
would be likely to generate significant spillover effects.4
The randomization was performed among the schools in which at least one teacher stated willingness
to participate in the program. Therefore, the estimated impact of the program is the average treatment
effect on the treated and is not readily generalizable to the population. However, in terms of the
external validity of our results, we should note that teachers who do not participate in our program
are generally involved in other projects offered to elementary schools (e.g. on environmental awareness,
health and dental care, cultivating reading habits etc.), and in this sense, our sample is unlikely to
represent a particularly conscientious teacher group.5 In fact, approximately 60% of the contacted
teachers accepted our offer and the most common reason for non-participation was being “busy with
other projects, although happy to participate in this program at a later date” (about 20%). The rest
of the non-participation was due to “impending transfer to a school in another city, with a willingness
to participate if the program is implemented there” (about 5%), and being “not in a position to
participate due to private circumstances” (about 10%).6
4Istanbul is a very large city and our schools are geographically spread out. We therefore do not expect any spillover
problems across schools.
5Program offer was also made by giving very little information about the content. The program was titled “financial
literacy, savings and economic decisions” and apart from the knowledge that the program would aim to promote financial
literacy and savings behavior, no further information on the particulars of the program was disclosed to teachers prior
to the teacher training seminars.
6The remaining 5% promised to call back with their response but never did.
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We performed the random assignment immediately after a positively ended phone call, as we had
to inform the teachers for the upcoming training seminars in case they were assigned to the initial
treatment group. We offered two alternative dates to make sure they could come to the seminars,
which took an entire day. After we reached the number of schools for which teacher seminars and data
collection were feasible, we stopped the calls. With this procedure, we ended up with 15 schools in IT,
10 in CT and 12 in PC, totaling 37 clusters (schools).
All involved teachers were promised to eventually receive all training materials and to participate
in training seminars, but they were not told when within the next two academic years they would
receive the treatment, until the random assignment was completed. The promise of the training offer
was made to the teacher and not to current students, that is, while children in the pure control group
never received the training as they moved on to middle school after year 4, their teachers would, albeit
at a later time. This feature of the design allowed us to have a valid control group for follow-up, for
as long as the children stay in the education system.
Table 1 shows the design of the implementation and measurement phases. After the randomized
sample was obtained and before launching training seminars for teachers in the initial treatment group
(IT), data on a large set of variables were collected from the entire sample through student, teacher
and parent surveys, to obtain baseline measurements (Phase 0). The first phase of the program was
implemented in Spring 2013 by the teachers in the IT group and the second phase in Fall 2013 by
the teachers in the CT group. We collected the experimental outcome measures in four phases by
physically visiting all classrooms.
In Spring 2013, after the completion of training by the IT group we collected initial experimental
data from all treatment arms (see Section 4.3 for the details of the measurement procedures). Note
that at this point, neither the teachers nor the students in the CT and PC groups had received training.
Data on this phase allow us to assess the first, short-term impact of the training. At the end of Fall
2013, we collected another set of experimental data, again from all groups. This time, our CT group
had completed the program. Data from this phase allow us to assess 1) the impact of the training on
a new sample, i.e. establish robustness across samples, 2) whether the impact measured in the first
phase persists after eight months following the initial treatment, i.e. establish temporal robustness.
In Spring 2014, we collected a final set of experimental data from all treatment groups. The data
from this phase allow us to assess whether the treatment effect persists in intertemporal decisions
that are made anonymously, and up to one year after the training. In this phase, we also collected
end-of-4th-year administrative records for each pupil before they proceeded to middle school, in order
to see whether there is any impact of the program on a crucial real outcome: behavioral conduct. As
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we will present in Section 5.3, we document significant and robust treatment effects on patience in all
three phases in elementary schools.
In order to address the important question of whether these effects persist beyond the intervention
context (the child’s elementary school classroom) and in the longer-run, we conducted a final mea-
surement in Spring 2016. At this point, the children had moved on to middle school (6th grade, ages
12-13), and reaching them presented significant difficulties since there is no central database in Turkey
that enables tracking students. Enlisting the help of elementary school headmasters in obtaining a
list of schools in the neighborhood, where children in the sample may have gone to, we were able to
reach about 63% of the sample. 7 The probability of attrition is independent of the treatment status,
with p-values of 0.78 and 0.52 for IT and CT respectively. Moreover, the probability of remaining in
the sample seems to be independent of the patience measures. Evidence that the follow-up sample is
largely balanced with respect to baseline characteristics is provided in the appendix (see Table 13).
Nevertheless, we conduct all our long-term analysis using inverse probability weights to account for
the possibility of differential attrition. At the time of data collection (March 2016), 34 months had
passed since the conclusion of the training for the IT group, and 27 months for the CT group; see
Table 1 for full details.
Although the resulting dataset has a panel structure, since our goal is to establish the persistence of
treatment effects, we always compare treated children with untreated children, cross-sectionally at four
fixed time points (data collection phases), rather than studying changes within treatment or within
control over time.
4.2 Implementation and Teacher Heterogeneity
An important concern with respect to the implementation of the program is teacher heterogeneity.
Teachers differ in terms of their style of teaching, their dedication and their overall attitude toward
any given subject. Despite its well-structured form, the program we offer is expected to be implemented
in different ways and styles by different teachers, as is true for any other subject taught in elementary
school, including core subjects such as mathematics and science. Indeed, an anonymous survey we
conducted at the end of the whole study in June 2014 reveals that about 24% of the treated teachers
implemented the training material in a highly intense way, 73% implemented it at a moderate intensity,
and the rest said they did not have a chance to implement it.8 Given this heterogeneity, our treatment
7We did not visit middle schools with less than 10 students in our sample, due to logistical constraints. The experi-
ments were conducted by gathering the students in our sample in a classroom in each middle school. We were granted
permit by agreeing to do this in the least disruptive way.
8The question was “how intensely did you apply the training material?” and teachers could choose three options:
“I implemented it at a high intensity, “I implemented it at a moderate intensity”, “I did not quite have a chance to
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variable should be thought of as “program offer” rather than the program itself, since we can never
estimate the impact of the program itself. However, it should be noted that this is not a shortcoming
of the design and the effects we estimate are in fact the relevant inputs for policy, since if and when a
program such as the current one is scaled up, teacher heterogeneity in implementation is inevitable.
4.3 Experimental Outcome Measures: Intertemporal Decision Tasks and
Procedures
The core component of our methodology to evaluate the impact of the program is incentivized ex-
periments, which elicit intertemporal choices, time inconsistency and risk tolerance using real stakes.
Eliciting these attitudes and behaviors is now quite standard through widely-used experimental tasks
(e.g. Gneezy and Potters (1997), Holt and Laury (2002), Harrison et al. (2005), Andreoni and Sprenger
(2012)). We also evaluate the impact of the program on end-of-year behavioral conduct grades. These
grades are part of the official administrative records kept for each pupil in the school’s database.
We use two well-known tasks for documenting the effect of the treatment on children’s intertemporal
decisions: (1) a “multiple price list” (MPL) task, (2) a “convex time budget” (CTB) task. These tasks
construct incentivized decision environments where choices (such as waiting for a larger-later reward or
allocating less/more consumption to the earlier date) are known to be associated with time preference
and related behaviors and outcomes outside of the experiment. As reported in Table 1, our first
measurement phase uses MPL, while the subsequent phases use versions of CTB.
In the MPL task, subjects make a series of choices between a fixed amount to be received today,
and increasingly larger amounts to be received in the future.9 The minimum larger-later amount
that induces the individual to be willing to wait is a measure of impatience. That is, more impatient
individuals require a larger premium to be willing to sacrifice current consumption and wait for the
future reward. In our experiments, we fix the earlier reward to be 2 gifts out of a gift box that contains
toys, stationary, hair bands etc., whereas the larger reward ranges between 2 and 10 gifts (see the
appendix for the actual decision sheets). We give children two multiple price list sheets that include
9 decisions each, between: (1) two gifts today versus more gifts to be received one week from today,
(2) two gifts to be received in one week from today versus more gifts to be received in two weeks from
today. At the end of the experiment, one decision out of one of the two lists is randomly selected,
and rewards are given according to subjects’ choices in the selected decision problem. By keeping the
implement it”.
9See Andersen et al. (2006) for a methodological discussion and Andersen et al. (2008) for its use along with risk
preferences in estimating discount rates. The task has also been used in children and adolescents, by Bettinger and
Slonim (2007), Castillo et al. (2011) and Sutter et al. (2013), among others.
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delay length the same and varying the delay to the earlier reward, these two sets of decisions allow
us to both measure patience and identify time inconsistency. As shown in Table 1, we use the MPL
task to compare three groups: the IT group, the CT group, and a random subset of schools in the PC
group. Because of the phase-in design and the measurement timetable, only the IT group had received
the treatment when the MPL task was implemented, and the other two groups serve as control in this
task.
The second type of task we use is a version of the Convex Time Budget (CTB) task, adapted from
Andreoni and Sprenger (2012). In this task, children are asked to allocate 5 tokens between an earlier
and a later option, where waiting pays according to an interest rate. We keep the timing of the early
reward and the delay consistent with the MPL task (today vs. one week later and one week vs. two
weeks). For each of these time profiles, subjects make one decision with an interest rate of r=0.25 and
one with r=0.5. In total, children make 4 decisions, one of which is selected randomly and implemented
(see Appendix). In order to facilitate comprehension, we introduce two bowls, an “earlier” bowl that
gives gifts today (or in one week, depending on the decision problem), and a “later” bowl that gives
gifts one week (or two weeks) later. Children are told that tokens placed in the future bowl “give
birth”, that is, each token placed in the future bowl generates an extra half token (or one quarter of a
token, depending on the interest rate).10 After graphically presenting all 6 options on the blackboard
while explaining the task (see Figure 3 in the online appendix for an example of how we graphically
present the options), students are distributed choice sheets that include all the options, and then they
are asked to pick one. While the MPL task was implemented at the time when only the IT group had
received treatment (Phase 1), the CT group had also received the training when we implemented the
CTB task (Phases 2, 3 and 4). That is, the treated group in the analyses using CTB includes both the
IT and CT groups, whereas PC serves as control. In the results section, we report treatment effects
for the pooled treatment group (IT+CT) as well as for the two treated groups separately.
In the 3rd measurement phase, the CTB was used again; however, the procedures were somewhat
different. Specifically, the children now made the intertemporal allocation choice anonymously, and
everyone in the class received the same early and late reward, based on the random selection of one
(anonymous) decision. This third measurement phase was intended to give the program the least
chance to work, in the sense that (1) for the IT group more than one year had passed, and for the
CT group about 6 months had passed since the implementation of the program, (2) with anonymity,
there could be little motive to please the experimenters and/or the teacher or classmates (see Section
10Children are explained at the outset that there are gifts of different value in the gift basket, corresponding to full,
half, and quarter tokens. It is also possible to get a full-token gift with two half-tokens or four quarter-tokens.
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5.7 for a more extensive discussion of this concern).11
For the long-term follow-up in middle schools (Phase 4), we used the CTB task with two different
horizons (one-week delay and two-weeks delay between the earlier and the later reward). The reason
for including the longer horizon was to address the possibility that it may be too easy for older children
to wait for one week and there may not be sufficient variation in decisions to detect treatment effects.
For each horizon, we also varied whether the earlier reward came today or later. The interest rate
was kept constant at r=0.5. That is, children made four choices that included allocating 5 gift tokens
between today vs. one week, one week vs. two weeks, today vs. two weeks, and two weeks vs. four
weeks. One of these decisions was randomly selected at the end, to be implemented.
MPL and CTB are the two major tasks that are widely used in the experimental economics literature
to study intertemporal choices. Both measures have their advantages as well as potential issues. One
such issue with the MPL task, particularly relevant in our sample of children, is that populations with
lower education or cognitive development may have a harder time understanding price lists (Angerer
et al. (2015), Charness et al. (2013)). On the other hand, choices cumulating on corner allocations
is a potential issue for CTB.12 Andreoni et al. (2015) find that the two measures perform equally
well in terms of predictive power within-sample, while CTB performs better in terms of out-of-sample
prediction. The two main reasons for using different elicitation tasks rather than a single task was to
prevent children from making the same choice as before to appear consistent (see, for example, Falk
and Zimmermann (2011) for the documentation of such a motive in experimental decisions) and to test
the robustness of the treatment effect to each of the two major tasks used in the experimental literature
on time preference. Another point of potential concern when using the same task repeatedly in our
specific context is the teacher learning about the task ex-post from students and somehow suggesting to
children what they should do/should have done in this task. Although we do not believe that teachers
have any incentive to do so, if such an effect is there, it would be reduced by introducing a new task. In
fact, while CTB was used in measurement phases 3 and 4 as well as Phase 2 (primarily because we found
it easier for the children in our sample to comprehend), there were differences in its implementation in
each phase. Using different tasks in different measurement phases does not compromise our estimation
strategy, since our goal is to compare intertemporal decisions across treatment and control at fixed
points in time, rather than estimating and studying the evolution of individual discount rates over
time. In any given measurement phase, the same task (either MPL or CTB) is implemented for all
11It should be noted, however, that this design has the disadvantage of weakening the incentives for an individual
child.
12We show later in the text (Section 5.2) that this is not the case in our sample, and the distribution of the allocations
is reasonably balanced.
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groups, treatment and control alike, which allows us to estimate treatment effects on choices and study
their persistence. While we never compare behavior across the two tasks in our estimation of treatment
effects, it is useful to note that Angerer et al. (2015) compare the two methods we use (MPL vs. our
simplified version of CTB) in a sample of children and find that the two measures yield very similar
aggregate results, with behavior in the two tasks correlating significantly within subjects and explained
by the same explanatory variables. A strong correlation between the two measures is present in our
data as well.
In addition to intertemporal choices, we also have access to the choices of the children under risk,
both at baseline and follow-up. For risk preference elicitation, we use a version of the task in Gneezy
and Potters (1997), where children have 5 tokens to allocate between a riskless option and a risky
option. With 50% chance, the tokens invested into the risky option are tripled, and with 50% chance
they are lost, depending on the color of a ball that the child draws from an opaque urn that contains
one yellow and one purple ball. Tokens invested in the riskless option are safe. A higher number of
tokens invested in the risky option indicates higher risk tolerance. This task has been used to elicit a
measure of risk aversion in addressing various research questions both in the lab and in the field, and
with diverse subject pools, including children (Alan et al. (2017)). The major advantage of the task
is that it is intuitive and easy to understand, and involves a single decision. In fact, this is why it has
been used quite successfully in field studies with rural groups (see Charness et al. (2013) for a review).
A common concern in intertemporal experiments where the early reward comes today is a potential
lack of trust in receiving future gifts. In terms of estimating the treatment effect, this should not be an
issue because of the randomized-controlled nature of our framework. As long as the issue of trust is not
different across treatment status, even if it is present, it would not bias our estimates. Moreover, any
trust issue regarding whether we will keep our promises and deliver delayed gifts would be expected
to disappear or lessen considerably after the first phase, i.e., after students received the gifts that were
left for the future date. Therefore the outcome measures in the second and the third phases (CTB)
are likely to be free from this concern since trust was fully established in the first phase. Still, one
way to check for such a possibility is to use behavior in the risk task. In unreported regressions, we
observe that risk preferences do not affect early choices differently in treatment and control, which
provides evidence against trust affecting behavior differently across treatment and control. We also
use the baseline risk tolerance measure as one of the covariates in all our treatment effect regressions.
All experiments were run in-class, with pencil and paper, and experimenters included the authors
as well as a team of student assistants.13 All experimenters followed lengthy and precise written
13We were also helped by a set of experienced interviewers contracted by a field company and trained by us, in
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instructions, were extensively trained by the authors and asked to perform mock trials observed by the
authors several times in addition to pilot runs in several classes. All experimenters (except the authors)
were blind to the treatment status of the school they worked in. Our data include experimenter
information for each classroom and all the following analyses (as regards the main data as well as
the data from the long-run measurement) include controls for experimenter. The gift bag contained
sufficient numbers of all types of attractive items, and children were assured that the same types
of items would be available to choose from in future rewards. Because incentives are of paramount
importance, we extensively surveyed several toy shops as well as children and mothers outside our
sample to identify items that tend to be extremely desirable for children of the relevant age group
in recent days. We also made sure to use different sets of toys and gifts that are of similar value
in different measurement phases, to avoid satiation and maintain comparability. We took great care
to ensure that teachers were not present when we explained the procedures and children made their
choices. We also arranged the timing of the visits to different classrooms within one school such that
children from different classes would not have a chance to talk to each other about the measurements.
5 Results
5.1 Data
Our sample consists of 3rd- and 4th-grade students in 73 classes (in 37 schools) for whom we have
either the MPL or the CTB measure. We have on average about 2 classrooms per school, with the
minimum number of classes per school being 1 and the maximum being 6. The average registered
number of students is 69.3 per school, with the minimum number being 18 and the maximum number
being 223 per school. Class sizes vary, from a minimum size of 15 to a maximum of 60 (the average
class size is about 35 children). Our experimental outcome variables are obtained from students who
were present in class on the day of the experiments, for others experimental outcomes are missing (this
amounts to approximately 1970 observations in the MPL task and 1880 observations in the CTB task).
We first check whether our data are balanced across treatment status with respect to a number
of student characteristics, collected at the baseline stage. Table 2 shows results from ordinary least
squares regressions of baseline variables on the two treatment dummies, IT and CT. While the first
column gives the mean of the respective variable in the control group, column 2 shows the difference
of IT from the control’s mean and column 3 shows the difference of CT from the control’s mean.
The variables are constructed as follows: Student’s family SES (socio-economic status) and her
conducting surveys.
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overall academic standing (academic success) are reported by the teacher using a 5-point scale. Cog-
nitive ability is measured using a Raven’s progressive matrices test (Raven et al. (2004)) and risk
tolerance is measured using the task based on Gneezy and Potters (1997). As can be seen from the
table, differences are not statistically different from zero across treatment and control for any of the
variables. This ensures us that our data are balanced across treatment status and our results are
internally valid.
5.2 Baseline Correlations
Figure 1 shows the distributions of our outcome measures in the control sample. The two figures in
the top panel depict the distribution of the MPL measures. Here, we see choices mainly piling up at
one early decision but the measure still gives us reasonable dispersion. The next four figures show the
distribution of CTB measures in the original elementary school sample and the last four show CTB
distributions in the middle school sample. The CTB measures also display considerable dispersion and
we do not observe any obvious pattern of piling on corners.
We then show that both of our outcome measures have strong links to children’s individual charac-
teristics and actual outcomes. In order to report these correlations in the absence of any intervention,
we use the control subset of our data. Given our measurement timetable, this subset is composed of
both CT and a subset of the PC schools in the MPL task, and the whole PC schools in the CTB
task. Table 3 shows that impatience, as measured by the average number of early choices in the MPL
task or the average early allocation in the CTB task, is negatively correlated with math grades and
cognitive function (Table 3, columns 1 and 2 for MPL, 5 and 6 for CTB). Children who are assessed by
the teacher to be well-behaved make more patient choices in both tasks, whereas children assessed by
the teacher to be easily distracted are more impatient (Table 3, columns 3 and 4 for MPL, 7 and 8 for
CTB)14. Note also that the two measures (CTB and MPL) are strongly correlated, with a correlation
coefficient of 0.33 (p-value=0.02).
These results are consistent with associations identified in the literature between individual char-
acteristics and time preference (such as the positive correlation between IQ and patience as in, for
example, Frederick (2005), Burks et al. (2009), Dohmen et al (2010), Benjamin et al. (2013)). This is
encouraging, in the sense that as expected based on the literature, the experimental measures are truly
eliciting an individual attitude and have predictive power over actual outcomes such as grades. We
14The table presents OLS coefficients from regressions of decisions in experimental tasks on actual outcomes and
individual characteristics. Results on math grades are reported but the results do not change if we use other grades such
as Turkish or science. The results are also robust to using the today-one week choices rather than taking the average of
all decisions. Standard errors are clustered at the school level and raw correlations are presented at the bottom of the
table.
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now turn to estimating treatment effects on our experimental outcome measures, namely the number
of early choices in the MPL and the number of early allocations in the CTB task.
5.3 Treatment Effect on Experimental Measures
Based on the null hypothesis that the program made no impact on the experimental outcome yE , we
postulate our main empirical model as follows:
yEij = α0 + α1Tj +X
′
ijγ + εij
where yEij denotes the experimental outcome, that is, the number of early choices in the MPL task or
the early allocation in the CTB task by student i in school j, Tj is a binary variable that indicates
the treatment status of school j, X is a vector of observables that are potentially predictive of the
outcome measures we use. These include student gender, baseline academic success, socio-economic
status and patience as assessed by the teacher, baseline risk tolerance, and baseline cognitive function
as measured by Raven’s progressive matrices. Since by design T ⊥ ε, the estimated αˆ1 is the average
treatment effect on the treated.
For evaluating the first phase, where schools in PC and CT bins serve as our controls, we estimate
the following equation:




For evaluating phases 2 and 3 (as well as long-term follow up), where only the schools in PC bin
serves as our control, we estimate the following equation(s):









where the first equation combines both treatment groups in the way that a given student is in the
treatment group if her school is in either the IT or the CT bin. The second equation allows us to
estimate treatment effects separately for the IT and CT groups and formally compare the estimated
effect sizes.
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5.3.1 Treatment Effect in Measurement Phase 1
Before moving on to estimating the effect of the treatment on intertemporal allocations, we note that
we find no evidence that the treatment alters the risk attitudes of the children. As can be seen in
Table 4, post-treatment (standardized) Gneezy and Potters allocations, which were elicited 1 year after
treatment for IT and 6 months after treatment for CT, do not seem to be affected by the intervention.
This holds true for the distribution of post-treatment allocations as well: a test of the equality of the
distributions yields a p-value of 0.72.
We then turn to evaluating the initial phase of the program using our first experimental outcome
measure, MPL, collected shortly after the end of the program for the initial treatment group.15 Table
5 presents estimated treatment effects on the number of early choices in the MPL task for today vs.
one-week and one-week vs. two-weeks trade-offs. The table shows that in the treatment group, children
demand on average 0.82 less gifts to wait for a week from today, and 0.83 less gifts to wait for a week
from next week. These estimates correspond to a 0.29 standard deviation effect for the former and a
0.27 standard deviation effect for the latter.
The kernel density estimates depicted in the top panel of Figure 1 shows the distributional impact
of the treatment on the average number of early choices in the today-one week and one week-two weeks
decision sheets in the MPL task. Apart from a clear leftward location shift, the notable observation in
this figure is that the treatment made the distribution of choices peak around a lower number of early
choices, resulting in lower post-treatment variance (variance of 6.70 for control and 4.6 for treatment).
The estimates we provide in Table 5 constitute our first, short-term impact estimates which compare
the students in the initial treatment group, IT, with those in the control group (CT+PC). In what
follows, we examine the second phase and show that the effects we estimate in the medium-term for the
IT group are qualitatively similar to these short-term estimates. Moreover, we show that the program
produces treatment effects that are of similar magnitude in terms of standard deviation effects in
another sample where we replicate the treatment (the CT group).
5.3.2 Treatment Effect in Measurement Phase 2
We next look at the impact of the program as measured in the 2nd phase, where the treated group
now includes both IT and CT, and the control group is PC. The outcomes measured in this phase
for the IT group can be considered as medium-term outcomes, since the measurement was carried out
15A number of subjects (225 children) make choices with multiple switchpoints in one or both of the MPL sheets, or
confess to not understanding the task. We exclude these observations from our Phase 1 analyses. It is important to note
that the incidence of such errors is balanced across the treatment groups (p-value=0.52). In addition, the incidence is,
as expected, strongly (negatively) correlated with cognitive ability. Inclusion of these choices into the analyses does not
have any material impact on the treatment effect estimates (results available upon request).
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eight months following the implementation of the program, and they can be considered short-term
outcomes for the CT group. In this phase we use the CTB task, with 4 decisions that vary in (1) the
delay to the early reward, (2) the interest rate.
Table 6 presents the estimated effect sizes for r = 0.25 and r = 0.5, when the decision is between
today and one week later. The first row of the table confirms that there is a significant treatment
effect at the 1% level on early allocations when we look at all treated students combined (IT & CT) vs.
pure control (PC). Treated children allocate 0.46 fewer tokens to the early date with the low interest
rate and 0.41 fewer tokens with the higher interest rate. Considering that the average numbers of
early allocations in the control group are 2.02 and 1.75 tokens with the lower and higher interest rates
respectively, these effects amount to statistically significant 23% reductions in the tokens allocated to
“today” in the treatment group for both lower and higher interest rates. The former represents a 0.27
standard deviation effect, while the latter represents a 0.25 standard deviation effect.
A natural question here is whether the effect of the program is different between the IT and CT
groups, since they were exposed to the treatment at different times but were measured at the same
time, with the data on the CTB task collected immediately after the treatment for the CT group and
about 8 months after for the IT group.16 Rows 2 and 3 in Table 6 show significant treatment effects
for both IT and CT groups estimated against the pure control group. What is striking is that the
estimated effect sizes are statistically equal across IT and CT, suggesting that the program generates a
persistent impact on these experimental outcomes. Formally, we cannot reject the equality of treatment
effects in the IT and CT groups against the PC group (Wald tests, p-value=0.90 and p-value=0.83 for
the low and high interest rates, respectively). Considering the lower interest rate case and the today
vs. one-week later decision for example, students in the IT and CT groups both allocate 23% fewer
tokens to the early date (the mean value of the tokens allocated to the early date in the PC group is
2.02 and the estimated treatment effects are -0.45 and -0.47 respectively). These estimates represent a
0.27 standard deviation effect for the IT group and a 0.28 standard deviation effect for the CT group.
Table 7 reports similar results for the one week-two week tradeoff. The estimated treatment effects
are 0.52 and 0.50 for the low and high interest rates, respectively, indicating that treated students
16Educational interventions implemented within this project are not confined to the treatment that is subject of this
paper. The IT group in fact received additional materials targeting grit, another important noncognitive skill, which
may or may not have affected the 2nd, 3rd and 4th phase results we present here for that group. In particular, these
additional materials highlight the view that abilities are malleable and can be developed through persistent effort in
performance contexts. Alan, Boneva and Ertac (2015) show that this intervention has significant positive effects on
ability accumulation and test scores. Given the statistically similar effect sizes we estimate in each of the 2nd, 3rd and
4th measurement phases for IT and for CT, who did not receive any additional materials, there is strong evidence that
the additional material did not affect the IT group’s intertemporal choices over and above the first material. In an
independent randomized study where children only received the intervention targeting grit, we measure post-treatment
intertemporal choices using a CTB task with a one week horizon and a 50% interest rate, and find no impact of the grit
intervention on the willingness to delay consumption. Specifically, we estimate a 0.005 standard deviation effect of the
pure grit treatment on the CTB measure, with a p-value of 0.97 in that sample.
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allocate approximately 25 and 27 percent fewer tokens to the early date relative to the control group
(control means are 2.05 and 1.86 tokens, respectively). Rows 2 and 3 report statistically significant
treatment effects estimated for both treatment groups IT and CT against control, and the estimates
are not statistically different from each other in size (Wald tests, p-value=0.66 and p-value=0.67 for
the low and high interest rates, respectively).
As depicted in Panel 2 of Figure 2, estimated kernel densities show the clear leftward location shift
in the Phase 2 measure in response to the treatment. As in the case of Phase 1, the post-treatment
distribution is more compressed: the variance of the outcome measure is lower than that of baseline
(1.74 vs. 2.05).
These results not only show that the program generates a significant impact on children’s intertem-
poral choices measured by incentivized tasks, replicated in two different samples, but also signal that
the impact of the program does not fade after an interval of 8 months. Note also that estimated
standard deviation effects after 8 months are remarkably similar to those we obtained immediately
after the program implementation (Phase 1). In the next section, we explore the persistence of the
treatment effect further.
5.3.3 Treatment Effect in Measurement Phase 3
This measurement phase uses a CTB task with a single decision (the trade-off between today versus
one week later, with an interest rate of 25%), conducted in an anonymous fashion to avoid potential
motives to please the experimenters or teacher. The measurements took place about a year after the
program was completed in the IT group, and about six months after in the CT group. Data from this
last phase therefore also helps show whether the treatment effect is still there, up to a period of one
year after training.
Table 8 presents the estimated treatment effects for this phase. While control subjects allocate 2.23
tokens to today, CT and IT groups allocate 0.64 and 0.72 fewer tokens, indicating treatment effects of
29% and 32%, respectively. Both combined (IT and CT) and individual (IT or CT only) treatment
effects are significant at the 1% level, and we again do not reject the hypothesis that the effect sizes are
equal between the IT and CT groups (Wald test, p=0.34). The clearly visible location shift depicted in
Panel 3 of Figure 2 also shows the significant persistent treatment effects in this measurement phase.
These results suggest that a significant treatment effect of a similar size to the original measurements
still stands under anonymity, and after up to a year from the implementation of the program. Given
these results on experimental outcomes, the immediate question that follows is: has the program made
any impact on actual behavior outside of experiments? The next section answers this question with
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respect to a crucial real outcome: behavioral conduct at school.
5.4 Treatment Effect on Behavioral Conduct
Impatience and impulsivity (lack of self-control) have been shown to play an important role in pre-
dicting antisocial/undesirable behavior in adults (see Fuchs (1982), Bickel et al.(1999) and Harrison
et al. (2010) for smoking, Kirby et al. (1999), Kirby and Petry (2004) and Madden et al. (1997)
for substance abuse, Petry (2001) for pathological gambling, and Beraldo et al. (2013) for criminal
behavior). Within the decision-making context of a child or adolescent, not obeying classroom rules
has consequences (being chided or given a bad grade by the teacher, disrupting the class, not learning
well etc.) that can be disregarded or overcome by an immediate benefit of doing as she/he desires
at the moment, if the child is impatient. Consistently with this, Castillo et al. (2011) find that an
increase in the discount rate is associated with an increase in the number of disciplinary referrals
that a child has the following school year, and Sutter et al. (2013) document a similar relationship
between impatience and behavioral conduct at school. Nagin and Pogarsky (2004) find that children
and adolescents with high discount rates and low self-control (independently) were more involved in
criminal activities. In a longitudinal study, Akerlund et al. (2016) show that time preference mea-
sured at the age of 13 predicts criminal activity later in life, pointing to the importance of preferences
in adolescence for future behaviors and outcomes. Research in criminology and psychology has also
documented strong associations between childhood delinquency and adult crime or antisocial behavior
(see Sampson (2016) and the references therein). Recall that within our sample as well, there is a
positive link in the control group between how well-behaved the student is, as assessed by the teacher,
and how patient her decisions are in the CTB task.
The substantial evidence on the link between time preference and behavioral issues is the first
reason why we use students’ behavioral conduct in school as our real outcome measure. The second
is that a change in behavioral conduct (positive or negative) can be observed easily in the short term
and is in fact officially graded by the teacher, who has the opportunity to interact with the students
for at least five hours a day.
To explore whether the treatment has an effect on students’ behavior in class, we analyze official
grades that evaluate disciplinary conduct, given by the teacher and submitted to the school’s official
administrative database for the academic year 2013-2014. Note that these treatment effects can be
considered as longer-term effects within the elementary school period, because the behavior grades
were collected at the end of the academic year 2014, about one year after program implementation
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for the IT group and about 6 months after for the CT group. Giving us access to these grades was
entirely voluntary and out of 37 schools, 4 schools refused us access, one in the IT, one in the CT and
2 in the PC groups.
The “behavior grades” are based on a 1-to-3 scale that admittedly yields limited variation, but
nevertheless are useful to estimate treatment effects. Based on our prior investigation of the distribution
of these grades and also based on conversations with school administrators, it is understood that given
the large proportion of the highest score, any grade less than 3 indicates some behavioral issues for
sure, with most teachers content with giving a 2 in these cases. Specifically, 77.3% of the control
children receive a grade of 3, 20.2 % receive 2 and 2.5% receive 1. We therefore combine the lower two
categories (1 and 2) in defining a “low behavior grade”.
Table 9 presents the marginal effects from logit regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy
for the low behavior grade. The first column gives the marginal effects for the combined treatment
dummy (IT+CT) with covariates and the second column shows the marginal effects for IT and CT
separately. The table shows that the program has lowered the probability of receiving a low behavior
grade by about 10 percentage points. The effect sizes are remarkably similar across IT and CT and
we do not reject their equality (p-value=0.95). These results provide evidence that the effect of the
intervention extends beyond experimental outcomes.17 Among the covariates, not surprisingly, the
variables cognitive ability, teacher-assesed academic success and teacher-assessed patience at baseline
are significantly negatively correlated with receiving a bad behavior grade. For example, a one stan-
dard deviation increase in the cognitive score is associated with a 5.8 percentage-point decline in the
probability of receiving a bad behavior grade. Moreover, boys seem to be more likely to receive low
disciplinary conduct grades (about 12 percentage points).18
An important question here is whether the improvement in behavior scores is due to the improved
ability to defer consumption. Given the extremely targeted nature of the program with its exclusive
focus on forward thinking, we are inclined to believe that this is the case. Imposing the usual exclusion
restriction that the treatment affects behavioral conduct only through its effect on patience, we regress
behavior scores on our post-treatment CTB measure, instrumenting the latter with the treatment
17The treated group also has higher grades in core classes (Turkish, math, and life sciences) on average, but the effect
does not reach statistical significance. Specifically, treatment leads to a 0.05 standard deviation increase in average core
grades, with a standard error of 0.11. It is also plausible to hypothesize that an educational intervention of this type
may affect other outcomes in the longer-run, such as obesity. While our protocol did not allow us to collect this type of
data, we acknowledge that this would be a promising research avenue for the future.
18A potential concern here might be an increase in teachers’ leniency based on more intense interaction with students
in the treatment group. Looking at whether treatment effects on behavior grades change with respect to teacher seniority
or how long the teacher has been teaching this particular cohort may provide a way of addressing this, since more senior
teachers or teachers who already know the students very well are less likely to be “influenced” by their interaction
with the students in the context of the program. In unreported regressions, we find no differential treatment effects on
behavior grades with respect to either seniority or years of contact with students.
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dummy. The estimated effect would then give us the causal effect of patience on behavioral conduct,
provided that the exclusion restriction is valid. The results are given in the last column of Table 9.
We see that impatient behavior in the experimental task has a strong causal effect on the grades.
Specifically, one extra token allocated to the earlier date leads to 14 percentage point increase in the
likelihood of receiving bad behavior grade.
5.5 Treatment Effect in the Longer-Term (Phase 4)
Although the third data collection phase was conducted a year after and 6 months after treatment
for the IT and CT groups, respectively, students were still in elementary school and the important
question of whether treatment effects would persist in the longer-run, when students are not in the
same classroom with the same teacher anymore, would remain. In order to explore the longer-term
impact of the education beyond elementary school, we use our follow-up data from middle schools
(Phase 4).
Tables 10 and 11 show our main results on the treatment effect in the CTB task using Phase 4
data, for one-week and two-week trade-offs. The results suggest that up to almost 3 years after the
implementation of the program, treated children generally allocate less tokens to the earlier date than
control children, and this is true for each of the treated groups, IT and CT. Treatment effects are
particularly strong in the two-week horizon, with treated children allocating 0.29 tokens less to the
earlier date when the earlier rewards come today and 0.40 tokens less to the earlier date when the
earlier rewards come two weeks from now. These results are significant at the 5% level and correspond
to 0.18 and 0.25 standard deviation effects, respectively (see Table 11). The stronger effects with a
two-week horizon may be due to the fact that waiting for two weeks is more difficult, leading to more
tokens being allocated to the earlier date and making it easier to detect treatment effects. Note also
that, as expected, students allocate significantly more tokens to the earlier date as the time horizon is
extended from one week to two weeks: while the students in the control group allocate 1.78 tokens to
the earlier date when the trade-off is between today versus one week, they allocate 2.06 tokens when
the trade-off is today versus two weeks (see the control means in Tables 10 and 11, p-value of the
difference=0.004).
There are no “behavior grades” in middle school and instead, there is a system of disciplinary
referrals for students who get into serious trouble, which we were told was very rare. Given this,
in order to obtain a measure of behavioral issues as well as other outcomes and behaviors that our
intervention may affect, we asked students several questions using a 5-point item scale. We then
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constructed scores that measure forward-looking behavior, self-control/procrastination and behavioral
conduct.19 Table 12 presents the estimated treatment effects on self-reported behavior. As can be seen
from the table, we do not detect any significant treatment effect on these measures. We interpret this
as suggestive evidence that incentivization is quite important at the adolescence stage, where children
may be especially averse to doing tasks they deem to be boring or those that adults expect them to
do.20
All in all, these results show that treatment effects on the willingness to defer consumption in
incentivized intertemporal allocation tasks are remarkably persistent after approximately 3 years after
the program intervention, in each of the two treatment groups. Panel 4 of Figure 2 also shows this
persistent effect. While we see a clear leftward shift in the distribution, contrary to our previous
results, we detect a slight increase in the post-treatment variance (from 1.60 to 1.69). As this may
suggest that treatment effects may be persisting in a heterogeneous manner, we conduct a detailed
heterogeneity analysis in the next section.
5.6 Heterogeneity and the Persistence of Treatment Effects
We now turn to the following two questions: (1) is there a type of student whose behavior is affected by
this program more than other students? (2) Is there a type of student for whom the effect of treatment
on behavior persists into adolescence, while for others it fades over time? Identifying the nature of
such heterogeneity in treatment effects and their persistence is important for designing educational
interventions for populations of different composition.
In order to explore these questions, we use data from measurement phase 2 in elementary school,
along with the middle school data (Phase 4). As we will explain below, in the context of our evaluation
design, using Phase 2 data allows us to explore heterogeneity with respect to baseline preference reversal
types (present-bias, future-bias, and time consistency), in addition to other individual characteristics
such as gender, baseline academic standing and socioeconomic status. We use the middle school
data to see whether the treatment effect persists differentially for students with different baseline
characteristics, and to compare the patterns of heterogeneity in the short-run with those in the longer-
run.
With many studies pointing out that girls and boys tend to exhibit significantly different behavior
in a wide range of decision-making contexts, even in childhood, an obvious subgroup analysis is one
19Translations of the survey questions can be found in the online appendix.
20The importance of proper incentives in minimizing the effect of nuisance variables such as boredom is well-known in
experimental economics (e.g. Smith and Walker (1993)). More research is needed to understand to what extent surveys
and incentivized measures capture the underlying traits and how incentives and context interact, in different age groups.
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based on gender. In addition to gender, we investigate heterogeneous impacts based on children’s
academic standing at baseline. While academic inclination may be a catalyst in being open to and
internalizing an educational program like this, academically successful students may also not have
much room to benefit from the program as they tend to make patient intertemporal decisions anyway.
Finding out the effects of the program on children of low and high academic standing is valuable
since academic performance is an important criterion in the design and targeting of many educational
policies. Finally, as many studies show the importance of socioeconomic status in shaping children’s
cognitive and noncognitive skills (e.g. Deckers et al. (2015)), we also examine heterogeneity based on
family SES, again, without any prior expectation regarding the direction of the results.
Figure 3 plots estimated treatment effects on the number of early allocations in the CTB task and
associated 95% confidence bands for each subgroup, for both elementary and middle school data.21
As shown in the top left panel of Figure 3, while the treatment was effective in reducing the number
of early allocations for both boys and girls in Phase 2 (in elementary school), the effect seems to
have dissipated for boys and remained statistically significant only for girls in middle school. Note,
however, that we do not reject the estimated longer-run treatment effects being statistically equal
across gender (p-value=0.51). The top right panel of the same figure presents a similar analysis based
on the academic standing of the student as reported by the teacher at baseline. Here, we observe that
the treatment was effective for all students, high and low academic standing alike in Phase 2 but the
effect seems to persist only for the more successful students in the long-run and equality of treatment
effects in the longer-run is rejected in this case (p-value=0.03). An analysis based on teacher-assessed
family SES shows no heterogeneity in elementary school. In the longer-run, the effect remains strong
for low-SES children. The point estimate obtained for high SES is similar (p-value=0.72) but it does
not reach statistical significance, which may be due to the small size of this group of students in our
sample.22
Given the focus of the intervention on intertemporal decision-making, we also ask whether the
program has a larger (or smaller) effect on children with existing self-control issues.23 In order to
explore this, we use a feature of our design that allows us to identify dynamic inconsistencies (preference
reversals) in addition to impatient choices in the baseline. Recall that both the CT group and a random
21The elementary school results are obtained using the CTB task with the today-one week tradeoff and r=50%. The
middle school results are obtained using the today-two weeks tradeoff with r=50% because of the stronger treatment
effect we estimate than the today-one week tradeoff; however, patterns are largely robust to using the one-week horizon
or the decisions with front-end delay.
22Both academic standing and SES are reported by the teacher at baseline, based on a 5-point scale. Students who
are categorized as high academic standing or high SES are those who receive a rating of 4 or 5.
23We also look at the overall distribution of time consistency across treatment and control and we do not find any
significant effect on time consistency, either in elementary school or in middle school. Related results are available
in the online appendix. Luhrmann et al. (2015) find that financial education decreases narrow bracketing and time
inconsistency over monetary rewards.
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subsample of the PC group had completed the MPL task before any treatment. At the time when
they went through the CTB task, however, the CT group had received training whereas the PC group
had not. Taking advantage of this design feature, we are able to classify children in terms of their
pre-treatment biases based on the MPL task, and look at their post-treatment choices in the CTB task.
This allows us to measure the effect of treatment on children that were, for example, present-biased in
the baseline.
In order to measure dynamic inconsistency in the MPL task, we compare the early choices made
in the today-one week and one week-two weeks decision problems. According to the standard (expo-
nential) discounting model, individuals would be expected to choose the same switch-point in the two
multiple price lists that involve the same delay of one week, regardless of when the early reward comes.
Such behavior indicates dynamic consistency. We classify our subjects as present-biased (increasingly
patient or hyperbolic) if the premium they require to wait is higher when choosing between today
and one week later, than when choosing between one week and two weeks later. Such individuals
are more patient in future trade-offs that do not involve the present. Finally, we classify subjects as
future-biased (increasingly impatient or hypobolic) if they are more patient in decisions that contain
trade-offs between today and one week, than in decisions between one week and two weeks.24
In order to understand treatment effect heterogeneity based on dynamic consistency, we estimate
the average treatment effects on the number of tokens allocated to the earlier date in the CTB task,
conditionally on the three types of dynamic consistency/inconsistency as measured by the MPL task:
exponential, hyperbolic and hypobolic. Of course, we cannot use the IT group for this analysis, as
both MPL and CTB were performed post-treatment for this treatment group. The lower right panel
in Figure 3 shows that the treatment was effective for all three types, with those who are found to be
present-biased (hyperbolic) in the baseline benefiting the most from the treatment in Phase 2. The
estimated effect size for these children is significantly larger than the effects for exponential discounters
and hypobolic discounters (p-value=0.04 for the former and p-value=0.02 for the latter). However, an
interesting result emerges in the long-term follow-up (Phase 4): the treatment effect persists only for
exponential discounters, and largely disappears for the other two types.25
Overall, although mainly suggestive, we find evidence that the treatment made a short-term impact
on boys, children who were academically less successful, and those who displayed dynamic inconsis-
tencies in the baseline, while it had a persistent impact on the behavior of girls, as well as children
24We use the terms "hyperbolic" and "hypobolic" as they have been used in the literature to capture present-bisaed
and future-biased behavior, but do not make a claim that the preferences underlying the decisions we observe necessarily
fit these functional forms.
25We do not reject the equality of estimated coefficients for the case of exponential versus hyperbolic discounters
(p-value=0.30), but reject for the case of exponential versus hypobolic discounters (p-value=0.05).
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who were academically successful and dynamically consistent at baseline.26
5.7 Addressing Potential Demand Effects
One potential issue in a study like the current one is potential “demand effects”, reflecting the concern
that the revealed preference to delay consumption in our experiments may be coming from the desire
to please or conform to the expectations of the teacher or the experimenter. If this is the case,
experimental results would not be coming from actual preference shifts and would possibly be short-
lived. The fact that we have a treatment effect on an important actual outcome provides strong
evidence that the training has led to “real” behavioral shifts in the treated children. However, we still
address potential demand concerns in terms of our experimental outcomes below.
Several measures were taken at the design stage, to address and/or reduce the extent of potential
demand effects: (1) giving powerful incentives: the gifts were chosen to be extremely attractive,
especially for this sample of children who come from a lower socioeconomic background27, (2) the
teacher was not present while the experiment was conducted, and because other measures such as risk
tolerance were collected and extensive surveys were administered, our visits were not directly linked
to the training program in children’s minds, (3) experimental procedures involved an introduction
that emphasized individuals being different, having their own preferences, and that there is no right or
wrong decision in any of the tasks students are presented with, (4) the 3rd measurement was conducted
anonymously, making it impossible for anyone to know a particular child’s decisions, and was well past
the period in which these ideas were discussed in class, (5) we collected baseline data from the teachers
about the propensity of each child to desire to please and conform to/obey the teacher, as well as
self-reported data from the child about how important it is for her to comply with things that she feels
are expected of her.
Looking at the data, the first observation to make in this regard is that with anonymity, treat-
ment effects are still very strong and significant (see Table 8). In addition, neither teacher-assessed
conformity nor self-reported compliance with expectations has any interactions with treatment effects
in any task.28 These results, coupled with the improvements in actual behavioral conduct, make us
quite confident that the experimental findings we document are not due to demand effects and reflect
26We also find that treatment effects persist mainly for children who had a younger teacher. Although acknowledging
its importance for policy, we leave the detailed heterogeneity analyses based on teacher characteristics for future research,
as the number of teachers in our sample is too small to do this analysis robustly (73 teachers in total).
27In order to ensure the attractiveness of the gifts, the research team extensively surveyed what items were in fashion
among kids of this age before buying the gifts. We believe that we picked a variety of gifts that students in our sample
usually do not get from their parents. We exercised the same care for our middle school children as well, and the set of
gifts was composed of items that were determined to be of value to older children.
28Regression results are available upon request.
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real changes in behavior.
Finally, the measurements in middle school enable us to further address potential teacher- and/or
experimenter-demand effects. Even if there were such effects in elementary school, we would expect
them to dissipate in the longer run, when the children do not have the same teacher or classmates
anymore and they become adolescents who are less likely to conform to the expectations of adults.
Documenting a treatment effect almost 3 years following the intervention likely suggests that the
behavioral change does not reflect a desire to conform to expectations formed during the program but
rather is a “true” choice. Another interesting point to note here is that in the longer run, we observe an
effect only in the incentivized elicitation task, i.e. in behavior rather than self-reports. This provides
further evidence against a desire to please the teacher/experimenter, since if there were such a motive,
we would expect it to be most easily reflected in survey responses and less so in incentivized tasks.
6 Summary and Conclusion
In this paper we report results from the impact evaluation of a randomized educational intervention on
children’s intertemporal choices. The intervention aims to improve the ability to imagine future selves,
and emphasizes forward-looking behavior using a structured curriculum delivered by the children’s
own trained teachers. The effectiveness of the program is evaluated using incentivized intertemporal
decision tasks as well as official end-of-year behavior grades as outcome measures. We report very
promising results with respect to the impact of the program on intertemporal decisions: treated children
make significantly more patient choices in incentivized decision tasks that present trade-offs between
smaller-earlier and larger-later rewards. These effects are documented in three different measurement
phases in elementary school, and largely persist into adolescence (middle school), after up to 3 years
after the intervention. We also find that treated students are significantly less likely to receive a
low “behavior grade” in elementary school, showing that the treatment can be effective in reducing
behavioral problems at school.
A particular strength of our design is that we can measure the impact of the program with two
independent treatment groups, with multiple measurements at different intervals after the program
was implemented, and with different elicitation tasks. This type of design is quite unlikely to generate
favorable results if a true and robust impact is not there. This is because we not only estimate
the impact of the program at a single point in time and in a single sample, but also further ask
whether the treatment effects are temporally persistent and replicable across different samples in
size and in precision. The robustness of the treatment effect in different samples and with different
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measurement methods, and the presence of an effect on a crucial real outcome, provide evidence that
the observed effects are genuine and replicable. Coupled with the persistence of the treatment effect
after a considerable amount of time, these results make a strong case for the possibility of developing
forward-looking behavior in the classroom environment through an educational program.
Our follow-up data suggest that while the treatment makes a more uniform impact in the shorter
run, the persistent effect in the longer run pertains to certain subgroups, particularly, students that
were academically better and more rational at baseline. In terms of policy, this suggests that more
intensive or continued training programs may be necessary to prevent the effects from fading out for
academically less successful children.
While our study design allows us to estimate the overall impact of the program, as in many program
evaluation studies it is not possible to precisely identify which aspect(s) of this particular program
generated the results we report, without assuming a structural model. In this paper, we choose not to
subscribe to any particular theoretical model to guide our empirical work or to interpret our findings.
We rather focus on the question of whether it is possible to achieve measurable changes in behavior
through emphasizing specific concepts in the classroom environment, to which we give an affirmative
answer. It is, of course, possible to design future interventions similar to ours by embedding features
or experiments that would allow one to differentiate between competing mechanisms of change. We
leave this for future research.
While much is now known in terms of which noncognitive skills are crucial for improving academic
success and behavioral conduct in children and adolescents, more research is needed to explore edu-
cational channels to enhance these skills. There is no doubt that the family plays a crucial role in
this respect. However, in parts of the society where families are not in the position of transferring
these skills to their children for reasons typically related to poverty and illiteracy, our paper provides
evidence that all is not lost, and that skills such as forward-looking behavior can be developed and
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Tables
Table 1: Program Design and Measurement Phases
Initial Treatment (IT) Control-then-Treatment (CT) Pure Control (PC
Phase 0
Program Implementation - - -
Measurement March 2013 March 2013 March 2013
(Baseline Data) (Baseline Data) (Baseline Data)
Phase 1
Program Implementation March-April 2013 - -
Measurement May 2013 May 2013 May 2013
(Multiple price list) (Multiple price list) (Multiple price list, random subset)
Phase 2
Program Implementation - October-November 2013 -
Measurement December 2013 December 2013 December 2013
(Convex time budget) (Convex time budget) (Convex time budget)
Phase 3
Program Implementation - - -
Measurement May 2014 May 2014 May 2014
Convex time budget (anonymous) Convex time budget (anonymous) Convex time budget (anonymous)
Phase 4
Program Implementation - - -
Measurement March 2016 March 2016 March 2016
(Convex time budget) (Convex time budget) (Convex time budget)
Table 2: Randomization Balance
Variables Control Mean Difference (IT) Difference (CT)
Male 0.52 -0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Behavior Grade (1-5) 4.29 0.06 0.15
(0.15) (0.16) (0.18)
Academic Standing (1-5) 3.40 -0.09 0.07
(0.05) (0.08) (0.07)
Family SES (1-5) 2.77 -0.01 0.13
(0.11) (0.14) (0.19)
Cognitive Score (normalized) -0.08 0.07 0.13
(0.10) (0.16) (0.16)
Risk Tolerance 2.67 -0.11 -0.10
(0.22) (0.24) (0.24)
Math Grade (1-5) 4.15 -0.19 0.07
(0.16) (0.21) (0.23)
Male Teacher 0.35 -0.06 -0.07
(0.11) (0.16) (0.16)
Teacher Age 33.4 2.51 3.71
(1.70) (2.41) (2.87)
Note: Clustered standard errors (at the school level) are in parentheses. Math grade, behavior grade, academic standing
and family SES are reported by the teacher at baseline, on a 5-item scale. Cognitive score is measured via Raven’s
Progressive Matrices. Risk tolerance is measured using an incentivized task based on Gneezy and Potters (1997).
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Table 3: Baseline Correlations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
MPL MPL MPL MPL CTB CTB CTB CTB
Math score -0.305** -0.383***
(0.11) (0.11)
Raven score -0.334** -0.348***
(0.14) (0.09)
Easily distracted 0.651** 0.372**
(0.24) (0.16)
Good behavior -0.394 -0.589**
(0.40) (0.18)
Raw Correlation 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.07 0.27 0.25 0.12 0.21
N 448 394 518 490 290 481 411 324
Note: Standard errors (clustered at the school level) are in parentheses and * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Reported
estimates are coefficients from OLS regressions of experimental choices (number of early allocations in MPL and tokens
allocated to the early date in CTB) on the respective variable. Math score and cognitive score (measured by Raven’s
progressive matrices) are standardized. Behavior grade, academic standing and family SES are reported by the teacher
based on a 5-item scale. Risk tolerance is elicited via a task based on Gneezy and Potters (1997).








Control Mean -0.03 -0.03
N 1874 1874
Note: Standard errors (clustered at the school level) are in parentheses and * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Reported
estimates are coefficients from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the standardized Gneezy and Potters
allocations to the risky option. Covariates are (baseline) teacher-assessed success, family SES, patience, Raven score,
pre-treatment risk tolerance, gender and experimenter dummies.
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Table 5: Treatment Effects on MPL (Phase 1, Elementary Schools)
(1) (2)
Early choices (Today vs 1-week) Early choices (1-week vs 2-weeks)
Treatment IT -0.822*** -0.833**
(0.27) (0.33)
Control Mean 3.024 3.281
Standard Deviation Effect 0.29 0.27
N 1748 1716
Note: Standard errors (clustered at the school level) are in parentheses and * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Reported
estimates are coefficients from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the number of early choices in MPL
tasks. Covariates (shown in the online appendix) are (baseline) teacher-assessed success, family SES, patience, Raven
score, risk tolerance, gender and experimenter dummies.
Table 6: Treatment Effects on CTB (Phase 2, Elementary Schools)
Today vs 1 week,r=0.25 Today vs 1 week,r=0.50
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment IT+CT -0.459*** -0.413***
(0.13) (0.11)
Treatment IT -0.454*** -0.407***
(0.13) (0.12)
Treatment CT -0.473*** -0.431***
(0.16) (0.14)
Control Mean 2.02 2.02 1.75 1.75
St. Deviation Effect(IT+CT) 0.27 0.25
St. Deviation Effect(IT) 0.27 0.24
St. Deviation Effect(CT) 0.28 0.26
N 1877 1877 1868 1868
Note: Standard errors (clustered at the school level) are in parentheses and * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Reported
estimates are coefficients from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is number of tokens allocated to the earlier date
in CTB tasks where the earlier reward comes today and the later reward comes in one week. Covariates (shown in the
online appendix) are (baseline) teacher-assessed success, family SES, patience, Raven score, risk tolerance, gender and
experimenter dummies.
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Table 7: Treatment Effects on CTB (Phase 2, Elementary Schools)
One Week vs Two Weeks, r=0.25 One Week vs Two Weeks, r=0.50
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment IT+CT -0.516*** -0.499***
(0.11) (0.14)
Treatment IT -0.530*** -0.484***
(0.12) (0.14)
Treatment CT -0.475*** -0.542***
(0.15) (0.17)
Control Mean 2.05 2.05 1.86 1.86
St. Deviation Effect(IT+CT) 0.31 0.30
St. Deviation Effect(IT) 0.32 0.29
St. Deviation Effect(CT) 0.28 0.32
N 1872 1872 1871 1871
Note: Standard errors (clustered at the school level) are in parentheses and * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Reported
estimates are coefficients from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the number of tokens allocated to earlier
date in CTB tasks where the earlier reward comes in one week and the later reward comes in two weeks. Covariates
(shown in the online appendix) are (baseline) teacher-assessed success, family SES, Raven score, risk tolerance, gender
and experimenter dummies.
Table 8: Treatment Effects on Anonymous CTB (Phase 3, Elementary Schools)
(1) (2)







Control Mean 2.23 2.23
St. Deviation Effect(IT+CT) 0.42
St. Deviation Effect(IT) 0.42
St. Deviation Effect(CT) 0.38
N 1826 1826
Note: Standard errors (clustered at the school level) are in parentheses and * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Reported
estimates are coefficients from OLS regressions. The dependent variable is number of tokens allocated to earlier date
in CTB tasks where the earlier reward comes today and the later reward comes in one week. Decisions are collected
anonymously, therefore no covariates can be used in the estimations.
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Table 9: Treatment Effects on Behavior Grades (Phase 3, Elementary Schools)




Male 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.066**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
High Academic Stand. -0.167*** -0.167*** -0.050
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
High SES -0.082* -0.082* -0.041
(0.05) (0.05) (0.03)
Risk Tolerance -0.005 -0.005 0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Raven Score -0.058*** -0.058*** 0.006
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02)






Allocations to Earlier Date 0.137***
(0.03)
Control Mean 0.23 0.23 0.23
N 1740 1740 1633
Note: Standard errors (clustered at the school level) are in parentheses and * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Reported
estimates are marginal effects from logit regressions where the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1
if the student received a behavior grade lower than 3. These grades are given using a 1-3 scale. Covariates are (baseline)
teacher-assessed success, family SES, patience, Raven score, risk tolerance and gender. The last column presents the IV
estimates.
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Table 10: Treatment Effects on CTB (Phase 4, Middle Schools)
Today vs 1 Week 1 Week vs 2 Weeks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment IT+CT -0.208* -0.325**
(0.11) (0.14)
Treatment IT -0.176 -0.281*
(0.11) (0.15)
Treatment CT -0.315* -0.474**
(0.18) (0.18)
Control Mean 1.78 1.78 2.07 2.07
St. Deviation Effect(IT+CT) 0.14 0.21
St. Deviation Effect(IT) 0.12 0.18
St. Deviation Effect(CT) 0.21 0.30
N 1171 1171 1172 1172
Note: Standard errors (clustered at the school level) are in parentheses and * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Reported
estimates are coefficients from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the number of tokens allocated to earlier
date in CTB tasks, with a one-week horizon and r=50%. Covariates (shown in the online appendix) are (baseline)
teacher assessed success, family SES, patience, Raven score, risk tolerance, gender and experimenter dummies. These
analyses are conducted using inverse probability weights to account for the possibility of differential attrition.
Table 11: Treatment Effects on CTB (Phase 4, Middle Schools)
Today vs 2 Weeks 2 Weeks vs 4 Weeks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment IT+CT -0.288** -0.404**
(0.13) (0.17)
Treatment IT -0.271** -0.341**
(0.13) (0.17)
Treatment CT -0.344** -0.622***
(0.17) (0.18)
Control Mean 2.06 2.06 2.32 2.32
St. Deviation Effect(IT+CT) 0.18 0.25
St. Deviation Effect(IT) 0.17 0.21
St. Deviation Effect(CT) 0.22 0.39
N 1173 1173 1176 1176
Note: Standard errors (clustered at the school level) are in parentheses and * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Reported
estimates are coefficients from OLS regressions where the dependent variable is number of tokens allocated to the earlier
date in CTB tasks, with a two-week horizon and r=50%. Covariates (shown in the online appendix) are (baseline)
teacher-assessed success, family SES, patience, Raven score, risk tolerance, gender and experimenter dummies. These
analyses are conducted using inverse probability weights to account for the possibility of differential attrition.
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Table 12: Treatment Effects on Survey Responses (Phase 4, Middle Schools)
Forward-Lookingness Self-Control Problems Bad Behavior
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment IT+CT 0.025 -0.038 -0.003
(0.07) (0.06) (0.10)
Treatment IT 0.013 -0.026 0.050
(0.07) (0.07) (0.10)
Treatment CT 0.063 -0.074 -0.173*
(0.09) (0.06) (0.10)
Observations 1100 1100 1111 1111 1152 1152
Note: Standard errors (clustered at school level) are in parentheses and * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Reported
estimates are coefficients from OLS regressions where the dependent variables are factors extracted from a survey that
includes questions on forward-looking behaviors, self-control problems and behavioral issues. Covariates (shown in the
online appendix) are (baseline) teacher-assessed success, family SES, patience, Raven score, risk tolerance, gender and




Figure 1: Distribution of Decisions in MPL and CTB (Control Sample)
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Figure 2: Densities of Choices in MPL and CTB Across Treatment Status
Note: Figures are kernel density estimates of the number of early choices in MPL and number of early allocations in
CTB across treatment status. Choices are averaged over two MPL tasks and allocations are averaged over 4 CTB tasks.
Solid line represents treatment, dashed line represents control.
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Figure 3: Persistence of Treatment Effects
Note: Figures plot estimated treatment effects and 95% confidence bands on choices in the CTB task with a 50% interest
rate. Point estimates represent the treatment effect on the number of tokens allocated to the earlier date. Confidence
bands are obtained via standard errors clustered at the school level . The top left panel shows the persistence of treatment
effects conditional on preference reversal types, the top right conditional on gender, bottom left conditional on baseline




Table 13: Randomization Balance After Attrition
Variables Control Mean Difference (IT) Difference (CT)
Male 0.48 0.03 0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06)
Behavior Grade (1-5) 4.25 0.10 0.26
(0.18) (0.20) (0.20)
Academic Standing (1-5) 3.36 -0.04 0.13
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08)
Family SES (1-5) 2.66 0.07 0.26
(0.12) (0.17) (0.23)
Cognitive Score (normalized) -0.11 0.03 0.19
(0.14) (0.21) (0.17)
Risk Tolerance 2.89 -0.37 -0.39*
(0.21) (0.23) (0.23)
Math Grade (1-5) 4.18 -0.26 0.06
(0.27) (0.289) (0.29)
Male Teacher 0.36 -0.07 -0.26*
(0.12) (0.17) (0.14)
Teacher Age 33.3 2.19 2.99
(1.90) (2.67) (3.30)
Note: Clustered standard errors (at the school level) are in parentheses and * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Math
grade, behavior grade, academic standing and family SES are reported by the teacher at baseline, on a 5-item scale.
Cognitive score is measured via Raven’s Progressive Matrices. Risk tolerance is measured using an incentivized task
based on Gneezy and Potters (1997).
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Multiple Price List Task
Children are asked to make a decision for each row in each list. Lists are presented separately.
Today versus One Week
© 2 Gifts Today © 2 Gifts in One Week
© 2 Gifts Today © 3 Gifts in One Week
© 2 Gifts Today © 4 Gifts in One Week
© 2 Gifts Today © 5 Gifts in One Week
© 2 Gifts Today © 6 Gifts in One Week
© 2 Gifts Today © 7 Gifts in One Week
© 2 Gifts Today © 8 Gifts in One Week
© 2 Gifts Today © 9 Gifts in One Week
© 2 Gifts Today © 10 Gifts in One Week
One Week versus Two Weeks
© 2 Gifts in One Week © 2 Gifts in Two Weeks
© 2 Gifts in One Week © 3 Gifts in Two Weeks
© 2 Gifts in One Week © 4 Gifts in Two Weeks
© 2 Gifts in One Week © 5 Gifts in Two Weeks
© 2 Gifts in One Week © 6 Gifts in Two Weeks
© 2 Gifts in One Week © 7 Gifts in Two Weeks
© 2 Gifts in One Week © 8 Gifts in Two Weeks
© 2 Gifts in One Week © 9 Gifts in Two Weeks
© 2 Gifts in One Week © 10 Gifts in Two Weeks
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Convex Time Budget Task
Children are asked to choose one of the 6 decisions in each column (presented as separate decision
sheets).
r = 0.25,Today vs. One Week r = 0.25,One Week vs. Two Weeks
© 5 Gifts Today and 0 Gifts in One Week © 5 Gifts in One Week and 0 Gifts in Two Weeks
© 4 Gifts Today and 1.25 Gifts in One Week © 4 Gifts in One Week and 1.25 Gifts in Two Weeks
© 3 Gifts Today and 2.5 Gifts in One Week © 3 Gifts in One Week and 2.5 Gifts in Two Weeks
© 2 Gifts Today and 3.75 Gifts in One Week © 2 Gifts in One Week and 3.75 Gifts in Two Weeks
© 1 Gifts Today and 5 Gifts in One Week © 1 Gifts in One Week and 5 Gifts in Two Weeks
© 0 Gifts Today and 6.25 Gifts in One Week © 0 Gifts in One Week and 6.25 Gifts in Two Weeks
r = 0.50,Today vs. One Week r = 0.50,One Week vs. Two Weeks
© 5 Gifts Today and 0 Gifts in One Week © 5 Gifts in One Week and 0 Gifts in Two Weeks
© 4 Gifts Today and 1.5 Gifts in One Week © 4 Gifts in One Week and 1.5 Gifts in Two Weeks
© 3 Gifts Today and 3 Gifts in One Week © 3 Gifts in One Week and 3 Gifts in Two Weeks
© 2 Gifts Today and 4.5 Gifts in One Week © 2 Gifts in One Week and 4.5 Gifts in Two Weeks
© 1 Gifts Today and 6 Gifts in One Week © 1 Gifts in One Week and 6 Gifts in Two Weeks
© 0 Gifts Today and 7.5 Gifts in One Week © 0 Gifts in One Week and 7.5 Gifts in Two Weeks
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